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ABSTRACT 
Information technology is an increasingly pervasive aspect of the healthcare environment, but 
introduction of new technology into complex systems like healthcare can create new opportunities 
for failure. Whilst literature on the unintended consequences of technology is extensive, less is 
known about the impacts it has on clinical work and patient safety. This paper reports the findings 
of a case study conducted at a large National Health Service (NHS) Trust in England, where 
electronic observations and alerting technology was introduced to replace paper charts. Using a 
qualitative approach, the study aimed to explore the impacts of this technology on a critical care 
outreach team’s performance and patient safety. Data from observation and ten semi-structured 
interviews with critical care outreach nurses were thematically analysed. The new technology has 
not only changed the way that patient observations data is recorded, displayed and viewed, it has 
also introduced a new mode of communication between groups of clinical staff: electronic alerts. 
Four main themes emerged that characterise the main changes brought about by the technology: 
communication, situation awareness, professional issues and workload. The relationship between 
aspects of these themes and patient safety was not perceived to be straightforward.  
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Introduction 
IT is an increasingly pervasive aspect of the complex sociotechnical environment of healthcare; 
indeed, a recent report of the National Advisory Group on Health Information Technology in 
England states that “NHS Trusts should be largely digitised by 2023” and that “regulators should 
begin to deem trusts that have not reached a high level of digital maturity to be out of compliance 
on quality and safety grounds” (Wachter 2016, p.5). 
Cook (1998), however, notes that introducing change creates new opportunities for potentially 
catastrophic failure, especially where technology is implemented in response to common and well-
understood system frailties. Whilst literature on the unintended consequences of healthcare 
technology is extensive, sociotechnical assessment of the impacts of technology on clinical work 
practices and patient safety is lacking (Waterson & Catchpole 2015). This paper aims to start to 
address this latter point, with specific reference to the impact of electronic observation and alerting 
technology on a critical care outreach team (CCOT). The aims of this study project were twofold: i) 
to explore how the introduction of a new electronic recording and alerting system for patient 
observations has affected the work of a critical care outreach team; ii) to assess perceptions of how 
the technology might be affecting patient safety. 
 
Method 
The setting was the critical care outreach team within a large NHS Acute Trust in England. The 
team has 24 nurses with a variety of clinical backgrounds including intensive care, general acute 
and emergency nursing. The team also comprises nurses with a varying range of experience levels. 
One of the main tasks the team carry out is to respond to deteriorating patients and life-threatening 
emergencies. The Trust adopted a mobile electronic observations chart in 2016 – known 
colloquially as E-obs – in response to concerns about the management of deteriorating patients 
from its regulator, the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The E-obs incorporates forcing functions 
for data entry, automatically calculates early warning system (EWS) scores and an electronic 
instant alerting feature for notifying other clinical staff including the CCOT. 
The main researcher of this study was a nurse within the CCOT. Observation and semi-structured 
interview with ten participants was carried out. Sampling was primarily purposive (n=8), with 
potential participants meeting the following criteria: current member of the CCOT; previously 
worked with the CCOT before E-obs was introduced; used E-obs in their clinical work with the 
CCOT within the last three months. 
As the study focused on exploring changes in the work system since the introduction of electronic 
observations, these criteria were selected to focus on those who had experience with both systems 
so as to maximise comparative experience between the two. However, a secondary convenience 
approach was employed due to time constraints, which extended the sample to include two nurses 
who did not meet initial inclusion criteria. Participant 6 was not in post when the bleep system was 
in use but was included because they had used a bleep system in their previous hospital. Participant 
9 was relatively new to the team and had no experience as a bleep holder. All participants were 
experienced registered nurses (median ≥10 years qualified) and had spent between one and eight 
years with the CCOT (median 3.5 years). 
Following two pilot interviews, interview questions were finalised covering the following four 
areas: i) differences between the old bleep system and the new electronic system; ii) impacts of the 
new system on their work; iii) perceived impacts on patient safety; iv) potential areas for 
improvement. 
Interviews were audio recorded for analysis and to enable the researcher to focus on the content of 
conversation whilst taking only brief notes on points of interest. Verbatim transcription and 
qualitative thematic analysis was undertaken using Nvivo 11 software. Detailed, open coding was 
initially employed resulting in a substantial list of codes which were then iteratively refined using a 
combination of reflective memos, reports and text queries to identify patterns in the data.  
Results 
Analysis revealed four main themes: communication, situation awareness, professional issues, and 
workload. 
Communication 
Effective communication from ward staff about deteriorating patients was cited by CCOT staff as a 
major contributory factor in creating good outcomes for patients, regardless of what system is used. 
However, several changes appear to have occurred in the way that the team communicate and are 
communicated with, including format, communication roles and feedback. 
Information that would have been conveyed verbally using the bleep system is now sent 
electronically and displayed instantaneously as a digital alert, presenting data both numerically and 
graphically. A perceived advantage of this format is that information is clearer and more accurate 
and many valued being able to easily check trends in the data. 
“you’re not relying on peoples’ ambiguous handwriting and wobbly lines on the obs chart” 
However, a strength of the bleep system was seen to have been the conversational dialogue about 
patients that occurred when nurses needed to refer a patient to the CCOT and was viewed as 
something to be preserved. This appears to be because, although information within the alert can be 
useful, it can be difficult to contextualise.  
“it's just a set of numbers that actually you can't put into context.”  
However, there was agreement that since its introduction, E-obs had become the referral route 
preferred by ward nurses, demonstrated by a drop in the number of bleeps received. Several 
participants viewed this as suggestive of a reliance on the electronic system for communication 
with the CCOT.  
“I just find now, that the bleep never goes and actually, it doesn't even need to be a bleep just a 
conversation that's not just reliant on an E-ob, I just feel like the communication about patients 
now is reliant on this text message alert system...”  
Participants postulated that this was due to the ease with which ward nurses could now pass on 
information about deteriorating patients, an aspect that was generally viewed unfavourably. 
“…it's so easy to press the button…”  
“…so then they would just press send...”  
However, one participant alluded to the positive potential this may have in overcoming professional 
barriers to communication between ward and CCOT nurses. 
“…sometimes if the nurse doesn't always know what's going on with the patient they probably 
feel a bit shy about having a conversation with outreach because we're probably seen as these 
super clever nurses and they don't really know what's going on with the patient and they just 
think if they can shove us some numbers we'll know what to do…”  
A characteristic of the old bleep system of referral was that conversations about deteriorating 
patients were usually initiated by ward nurses, with the CCOT on standby to receive these referrals. 
“…they had to make the decision of whether they needed someone or not and they had to pick 
up the phone and they had to alert us…”  
Whilst the initial contact is still made by the ward nurses by sending the electronic alert, 
conversations are now more commonly initiated by CCOT nurses in response to the need to 
contextualise the information as previously described. As a result, CCOT nurses appear to have 
assumed a much more active role in seeking out deteriorating patients, rather than more passive 
receivers. 
In fact, some participants perceived that there was now an expectation from some ward nurses that 
the CCOT would follow up on alerts by contacting them. However, seeking information through 
attempting to initiate conversations with ward nurses was often problematic, requiring multiple 
attempts by phoning or journeys to the ward.  
The timing and nature of feedback within the referral process also appears to have changed since 
the introduction of the electronic system. The closed loop nature of communication with the bleep 
system was regarded as a positive aspect for all staff involved. Firstly, ward nurses knew when their 
attempts to contact the CCOT had failed, prompting them to continue to seek help elsewhere. 
Secondly, CCOT nurses could be confident that their advice had been received.  
“…they would know that we had received the alert [bleep], by the fact that we rang them 
back” and “…phoning the ward would be my preferred method because you are physically 
speaking to somebody, you know the message has been relayed to them…”  
“With the bleep it was like, well outreach aren't answering, ok, so outreach aren't answering 
so what are you gonna do next? Well, well I'll get the doctor, because, they can't just write 
'outreach not responding', they've got to be seen to be escalating the patients, so when they 
send off that ob via [E-obs], they don't know, so it's... sometimes makes me feel a little bit 
uneasy.”  
With the new system however, this requirement for ward nurses to seek this confirmation is less 
clear and has potentially led to confusion about how to refer. For this reason, the CCOT continues 
to emphasise to ward staff the importance of ‘backing up’ alerts with a bleep, in order to reinstate 
this confirmatory feedback mechanism.  
Compounding this issue, the urgency of response demanded by the two technologies appears to be 
perceived differently, with bleeps requiring an almost immediate response and alerts less so. 
Therefore, a reliance on the electronic system to summon urgent help was seen to be problematic 
and even dangerous, because alerts are not always responded to immediately.  
CCOT nurses can use a button to decline an alert if they are busy with another patient but overall 
this function was not deemed useful because the alert is simply resent a few minutes later. Most 
reported accepting all alerts, with a minority claiming that they will decline an alert only if they are 
at an emergency, or to hand the alert over to a colleague. This can lead to multiple alerts being 
accepted and accumulated at once, with potential implications for how these are responded to. 
“…you can get maybe ten, fifteen alerts and sometimes if it's bleeping all the time and you just 
accept accept accept and you don't always see all of the clinical details and if you're busy with 
another patient then you might not actually get to see that EWS of eleven... for half an hour or 
more, which is dangerous and yes now we have the... the thing to decline, busy with patient, 
but then what happens...what happens to the patients?”  
Therefore, although an alert may have been accepted by the CCOT, the ward nurse sending the alert 
may not know if it has been reviewed and when to expect a response from the CCOT. Responding 
to an alert might involve simply adding a comment and closing it, phoning the ward, or attending 
the ward in person. Nearly all participants mentioned adding comments to alerts by way of 
responding. However, many were unsure about whether ward nurses could view these notes, 
bringing into question the purpose of adding this information. Rather than being a communicative 
task, intended to relay information back to ward nurses as might have been done when responding 
via the bleep system, it was in fact described as a documentary activity, for the purposes of audit 
and investigation. 
Situation awareness 
Whilst recognising issues with E-obs, most participants remarked that they would not elect to return 
to the bleep system if given the choice. A significant limitation of the paper chart and bleep system 
was that hospital-wide oversight was impossible because of the lack of remote monitoring 
capability and a heavy reliance on ward nurses to inform and update the CCOT about patients’ 
progress. Referring to how they would become aware of deteriorating patients previously, two 
participants described how they would accidentally discover patients whom they had not been 
contacted about.  
“...or if you're doing a walk round the wards, discovering... patients [laughs]”  
“...or, if I went to the ward and accidentally come across that patient...[laughs]"  
When the CCOT were not informed in a timely manner or there was not the fortune of ‘discovery’, 
this had potentially serious consequences for patients. Whilst there is still an expectation that it is 
ward nurses’ responsibility to inform the CCOT of a deteriorating patient, now however, they are 
also able to actively monitor for deteriorating patients through the CCOT virtual ward and can 
remotely track multiple patients.  
“…you might only know about patients if you were contacted about them previously, whereas 
now you can keep track of them the whole...the whole way through”  
“…it’s a big hospital to walk round just to look at the obs on paper… from a watching point of 
view, it’s great.” 
Professional issues 
The three related concepts of responsibility, ownership and autonomy emerged strongly from data 
from all participants and related to perceptions of their own work and that of the ward staff. 
Participants voiced concerns about how this might be affecting patients, with many describing how 
a lack of ownership and responsibility can lead to delays in treatment. 
“…when they press that submit button and it goes into the ether...I've done something about 
that because it's gone so...I've sent my...I've sent my alert, I'm just gonna carry on doing what 
I'm doing because they now need to respond to what I've sent, do you see what I mean?”  
Although improved awareness for CCOT nurses was generally felt to be a positive effect of 
increased availability of data, this was perceived to have come at a cost, contributing to a 
diminished sense of responsibility amongst ward nurses. Another described how the expectation 
that the CCOT would “know already” and attend by default, has eroded autonomy. Loss of control 
over one’s work – rather than responsibility – was a nuance within this narrative offered by one 
participant when referring to the bleep system.  
 “I don't know whether they had greater responsibility, but I think they felt personally more in 
charge…”  
Specifically, many interviewees mentioned the ease with which information could now be 
communicated – and the lack of thought required in this process – as a factor contributing to an 
erosion of these aspects of professional identity. Some also attributed it to a fear of litigation and 
pressures to follow standard policy exerted by the system itself.  
 “…it's a machine, it's telling you how you need to do stuff so people do it. There's no thought 
process in using this at all. I just don't...I think we've taken all that away from people.”  
“...but it just feels... sometimes it's just to cover the system um...”  
Interestingly, CCOT nurses used conversations as a way of returning some of the responsibility felt 
to have been carelessly shared with them. 
 “…it's kind of sharing that responsibility of that patient back again because you get it all 
dumped onto you when you get that E-ob alert...and making them think, right, could I do 
something more than what I've done?”  
In contrast to this perception of diminished responsibility in ward nurses, and perhaps because of 
this, CCOT nurses reported a strong feeling of responsibility within themselves towards dealing 
with alerts. 
“…you can't leave it once you've got it, you have to at least check that they're ok with 
things…”  
Some however, linked this with a sense of anxiety. This may be due to a characteristic of the bleep 
system, which is that there is no reliable way of recording if bleeps were received, by whom and 
what action – if any – was taken. In contrast, the electronic system can record the recipient of the 
alert, time of sending and completion and any comments added. As with perceptions of ward 
nurses, some CCOT nurses also reported feeling pressurised to respond in a certain way due to the 
fear of being reprimanded if something went wrong.  
 “…I'm very aware of protecting myself so writing 'I've discussed this with the ward staff' and 
I'll name if I know the names and what we've actually discussed and what the plan is so that if 
anything happens, they can come back and say that well actually yeah [name] did... [name] 
was present and she did...”  
Workload 
Although the scoring component of the early warning system has remained the same between the 
bleep and electronic system, workload was generally perceived to have increased with the new 
system, requiring CCOT nurses to continually triage and prioritise alerts. Real-time alerting is cited 
as a major advantage of the system but if nurses are busy with other tasks, this can be disruptive. 
"At the beginning I found it quite distractive and quite... unhuman...”  
Surprisingly, this increase in workload was not necessarily viewed as a negative thing, with one 
participant (Participant 3) suggesting that any issues associated with a heavier workload were 
potentially offset by an increase in awareness. However, three participants described what appears 
to be alert fatigue, with potential impacts on how alerts are responded to and prioritised.  
“You get, fifty-six of these in a day, I've probably taken in four of them…”  
“I don't know about anybody else but you can sometimes become a bit desensitised to it when 
it's going off all the time…”  
“…so you also fall into a sense of false security because if you have sometimes twenty E-obs, 
maybe nineteen isn’t appropriate so you’re thinking…ah it’s probably not going to be 
anything…”  
Potential reasons cited for this increased workload were easier and faster communication, and high 
volumes of ‘false’ or ‘inappropriate’ alerts. False scores occur where the EWS score does not 
represent a true picture of the patient’s overall condition, for example, patients in whom high scores 
are due to a stable chronic condition, or terminal illness. Equally, a low score can also be 
misleading.  
“…a score wouldn't tell you... a score... somebody scoring three could be sicker than 
somebody scoring eight or nine for example.”  
 “…the hardest part is when you have to decide which ones are relevant and which ones 
aren't…”  
Consequently, this difficulty in interpreting scores alongside high volumes of alerts can make 
prioritising work mentally demanding, time consuming and sometimes stressful, with participants 
using words like “daunting” and “overwhelming”. To deal with this, participants reported processes 
of ‘sorting and sifting’ when dealing with multiple alerts. However, a common strategy of working 
from the top of the list down was recognised to be problematic because alerts were typically 
displayed in time order with most recent first, resulting in a delayed response to the oldest alert. 
Additionally, all alerts are categorised as high priority and the score for each patient is not 
displayed on the list view, making comparison of scores between patients difficult. 
The time required to respond to alerts was seen to be important – in particular, time diverted 
towards dealing with false alerts can potentially increase the risk of delays in responding to 
deteriorating patients.  
“…sometimes, say, again, it comes down to um…inappropriate escalation, so that would 
disrupt my workflow, having to taking time that time out to go to that ward when I could be 
elsewhere seeing another patient.”  
Discussion 
A significant perceived benefit of the E-obs was the clarity delivered by the digitally displayed 
chart which eliminated any ambiguity caused by handwritten charts. However, contextualising 
information within the alert was reported to be problematic, a finding also reported by Reddy et al. 
(2005). In their study of wireless pagers in a surgical intensive care unit, they found: an ongoing 
need for doctors to contact nurses for more information so as to contextualise and prioritise alerts; 
that high volumes of alerts without prioritisation can create information overload; that 
conversations were viewed as a positive aspect of the bleep system to be preserved. In another 
study the importance of feedback mechanisms in technology-mediated communication between 
clinicians has already been noted (Reddy et al. 2003). Unfortunately, the study also confirms that 
this continues to be an issue despite 14 years of technological advancement. 
Professional culture between nurses and anxiety about communication has been recognised as a 
barrier to calling for assistance from response teams like the CCOT (Astroth et al. 2013). One of the 
perceived patient safety benefits of this technology is its potential to overcome this barrier through 
alerts, which removes the need for ward nurses to verbally communicate a referral in the first 
instance. However, (Reddy et al. 2005, p.234) report a loss of hierarchal context whereby junior 
doctors, who acted as gatekeepers for information, were bypassed by the technology, resulting in a 
loss of control of information flow to senior doctors: “the importance derived from a notification 
moving up the hierarchy is lost”.  
Increased interruptions was found to be significant in one study by Quan et al. (2013), as a result of 
the removal of traditional barriers to bleeping e.g. having to wait for a response. A culture of 
accountability was also found to be a contributory factor, underpinning decisions to send 
information and resulting in a higher burden of alerts. Interestingly, as with this study, a tension 
was identified between groups of staff (doctors and nurses) on the use of technology to either carry 
out or absolve oneself of professional responsibility (Quan et al. 2013). From a patient safety point 
of view, the implications of this are potentially serious, and warrant further exploration. 
Through focusing on the CCOT, this study was able to gain an in-depth insight into the perceptions 
of a single group of staff. However, a similar study exploring the perceptions of ward nurses would 
be desirable to balance and (to some extent) validate the findings reported here. Whilst studies that 
recognise the value of clinician experience and expertise such as this are important, research that 
assesses actual rather than perceived patient safety impacts of information technology is required 
(Nguyen et al. 2015). This should include more prospective longitudinal designs that capture the 
emergent and evolutionary nature of healthcare information technology (Waterson 2014). Finally, 
we need to consider how we can enable busy clinicians to effectively participate in the initial and 
continuing design of their working systems (Carayon 2006). 
Information technology promises to significantly improve clinician communication and improve 
patient safety; but in their systematic literature review of clinician-clinician communication, 
Nguyen et al. (2015) conclude that technology alone cannot be used as a solution to problems with 
urgent communication between clinicians. Based on their findings, they argue that whilst 
technology increases communication, improvements in quality are not guaranteed. This is echoed in 
a national safety alert that, whilst recognising its increasing use, states that technology must be 
situated within a “whole safe system of care” if patients are to benefit from its use (NHS 
Improvement 2016, p.1). The corollary of this is that these systems need to recognise the complex 
sociotechnical nature of healthcare, if technology is to be successfully integrated.  
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